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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
No. A-126 
,V, C. McDaniel et al., Applicants,] 
v. On 
Jose Sanchez et al. 
Application for Stay. 
{August 14, 1080] 
Mn. JFSTICE PowELL, Circuit Justice. 
This is an application for a stay of the judgment of the 
UnitC'd Rtatf's Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, pending 
con1:ncleration of a pcti tion for certiorari. Applicants are offi~ 
cials of Klebcrg County, Texas, who have been ordered by tho 
Fnited ~~:itaLes District Court for· the , 'outhcrn District of 
'l'exas to proceed immediately with procedures for the "pre~ 
clearance" of a new apportionment plan for county commis-
ioner precincts under§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S. C. 
§ 1973c. 
I 
This suit began in 1078 as a class action challenging the 
boundary lines of the four county commissioner precincts in 
Kleberg County. Plaintiffs claimed that these precincts, as 
rawn, violated the one-person, one-vote principle and 
unconstitutionally diluted the voting strength of Mexican-
Americans. After a trial, the District Court found that the 
precincts did violate the one-person, one-vote principle, but 
ruled that plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proof 
on the dilution claim. 
The District Court then directed defendants to submit a 
proposed new apportionment plan. That plan was drawn by 
a university professor selected by the county eommissioners 
and aDD(QYed for submission to the District Court by the 
C.Qll1t!}jssi.ci1ff's. The D1strict Court approved the plan ana 
rejected an argument by plaintiffs that precleara11ce under the 
McDANIEL v. SANCHEZ 
Voting Rights Act was necessary, relying on East Carroll 
Pm"~sh School Board v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 (1976) (per 
curiam). In East Carroll this Court stated that "court. 
ordered plans resulting from equitable jurisdiction over adver-
sary procredings are not coutrolled by § 5." I d., at 638, 11. 6, 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed in a per curiam opin-
ion. - F. 2d ~ (1980). IT r~li;d 011 this Court's later 
decision in W'ise v. Lipsc01nb, 437 U. S. 535 (1978), for the 
proposition that plans drawn up or approved by a legislative 
body are "legislative" plans even if submitted in response to 
a court order. As a result, the court of appeals found that 
the plan in this case is legislative and coneluded that it ie 
subject to the preclearance provisions of ~ 5. The court re-
manded the case for appropriate action and the District Court 
t hen ordered applicants to begin the § 5 procedures "immedi-
a tely.' ' On July 25, 1980, the Fifth Circuit denied a stay 
pending consideration of a petition for a writ of certiorari. 
II 
The preclearance procedures at issue .here require either 
an actiou iu the District Court for the District of Columbia 
for a declaratory judgment that the new plan is not racially 
discriminatory, or submission of the plan to the Attorney 
General of the United States, who may interpose an objec-
t iOn within GO days. 42 U. R. C. § 1973c. See Allen v. 
'tate Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 548-550 (1969). 
Applicants will argue in their petition for certiorari that they 
should not be required to follow these procedures because thi8 
apportionment plan was court-ordered and was not the prod-
uct of a lcgislativr action. They argue in this application 
that their petitwn is likely to be granted because the decisionB 
of this Court have left unsettled the principles that determine 
which apportionment plans are essentially "legislative," as 
opposed to "judicial," in nature. They further argue that a 
stay is necessary in order to prevent their claim from becom-
ing moot before it can be heard. 
In Wise v. Lipscomb, supra, we faced the question whether 
a plan for the election of members of the City Council of 
McDANIEL v. SANCHEZ 3 
Dallas was judicial or legislative. The existing system of 
electing members at large had been declared unconstitutional 
and the city had been given an opportunity by the court to 
produce a substitute plan. Because the plan submitted by 
the City Council, and approved by the District Court, in· 
eluded a provision for the election of several council members 
at large, it was necessary to decide whether the pl~n was 
invalid under East Carroll, supra, in which we held that jud't· 
cially imposed plans should not, absent special circumstances, 
include multimember districts. 
The Court in lf!ise decided that the Dallas plan was le~is­
l~e, rather than judicial, and therefore was exempt from 
the higher level /of scrutiny accorded to judicial plans. 
Mn. JusTICE WHITE, in an opinion joined by Mn . .JusTIC~ 
S'.I'EWAH'l', viewed the plan as one enacted by the City Council, 
emphasizing that in his view the Council was exercising its 
lawful powers in so acting. 437 U. S., at 546-547. MH. Jus-
TICE MARSHALL, in a dissent joined by MR. JusTICJ<J Bn~<.:NNAN 
and MR. .JusTICE STEVENS, agreed that the power of the legis. 
Jative body under state law to enact the plan at issue is an 
important ·factor, but disagreed about the powers possessed 
by the City Council in that case. He concluded that the 
Council could only have acteu pursuant to a court order and 
that the case ·was therefore controlled by East Carroll, supra, 
424 U. S .. at 638, n. 6, where we labeled a plan ".i udicial" 
partly because the legislative body had no authority to reap-
portion itself. 437 U. S., at 550-554. My <nJinion concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgme11t, joined by the 
three remaining .T ustices, asserted that assumptions about 
state law were "unnecessary" because the 11esseutial point is 
that the Dallas Cit Counc· xe c legislative judgment, 
reflecting the polic choices of the electe re Jresen atives of 
the peop e. rat er than t 1e reme 1al directive of a federal 
court." T d., at 548. 
Arguably, it was this last approach that the Court of 
Appf'als followed in tllf' present case. It determined that the 
plan was a legislative one because it was approved for sub-
lllission by the commissionel's of Kleberg Com1ty. The 
: 
McDANIEL v. SANCHEZ 
Court of Appeals was apparently unconcerned that the reap .. 
portionrnent n1ight 'be outside the commissioners' legislative 
powers.1 lf so, it can be contended that the court was fol-
'lowing an approach that has been endorsed by only a minority 
of Justices. Applicants also make a substantial argument 
that this approach is inconsistent with the decision in East 
Carroll, as thaL case has been interpreted by the majority of 
this Court.z 
III 
It i::; fair to say that the opinions in East Carroll and W·ise 
v. Lipscomb fall considerably short of providing clea.r guid-
ance to the courts that initially address this difficult issue. 
It would be helpful, therefore, for this Court to exercise its 
responsibility to provide such guidance. It seems to me that 
tlus case presents the opportunity. 
I nwnLion briefly the settled principles that govern the 
gm11ting of stays. Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. 
,'chuJingkamp, 419 U. R. 1301. 1305 (1974) (Powell, Circuit 
Justice); Graves v. Barnes, 405 U. R. 1201. 1203-1204 (1972) 
(Powell, Circuit Justice). In view of the ambiguity of our 
pn•cedc>uts (to which f may have contributed). I cannot say 
wlu·ther tlw possibility of reversal is significant. I do think 
there 1s a " reasonable probability'' that four Mernbers of the 
1
1 hlLler Tex. R<'v. C1v. tat. Ann .. Art. 2.04 (1) (\'l'l'non Supp. 1980), 
till~ (·ommJ~"ion<'r,; ran ouly Pnact. a, rrapport ionmrnt plan during thrir 
.lui) OJ' Augu»t. trrm~. SC'<' Trilson v. Weller. 214 S. W. 2d 4i:3 (Tex. Civ. 
App. l!llR) . The plan in thi~ cas<• was o-;ubmitted in ?\"ovrmbrr. Rc•-
i:>J>OIH.1Pn1c< !'onkncl, howevl•r, that. thr c·ommi~~ioner~ have an '·inlwreut" 
]JOWPr to rrapportwn thrir prrcinds wiH•n a "vacuum" hac; lwen created 
iJ) a <"ourt rulmg that the exi::;tmg; pn•cincts arc> drawn unconstitutionally. 
" lnd(•ed, 1hiH apparent· incoll~Jstl•ncy may have producrd a conflict, 
within t.he F1fth Circu1t. on thr i~,;ur~ rai;;ed here. Iu Marshall v. Ed-
~nards, 58:! F . 2d 927 (CA5 19iS) (en bane), ccrt. c!Pnied, 442 U. S. 909 
( HJ79) , a case involving t hP ;,;amr lit 1ga t ion as Ea~t Carroll but. an cu-
tirPly (hffereJJ[. plan , the Fd'th Circ111t labeled that plan "rourt-ordrr<'d" 
partly hl'C'iLU~e t.he legislative hod~' merely :-;uhmitted it., rather thun 
aduptiug Jl /d. , at 9:30-!)34 . Apphcaut:; contend thaL the comtni:;sioncr:; 
acted m a :-imllarly limit.Pd fa.sh1011 hel'C, 
McDANIEL v. SANCHEZ 5 
Court will consider the issue sufficiently meritorious-and the 
need for clarification sufficiently evident-to warrant a grant 
of certiorari. The applicants assert that, absent a stay, they 
will be required immediately to expend substantial money on 
preclearance procedures, and that this expenditure will be 
irretrievable. They argue further that without a stay their 
petition to this Court will become moot. The balance as to 
the possibility of "irreparable harm" seems to favor the 
applica11ts. 
I will therefore enter an order recalling the mandate and 
staying the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the }..,ifth Circuit pending disposition of the petition for 
certiora.ri. 
. \ 
in respon se to a court order to be submitt ed for precle aranc e 
to the Attorney Gener al or the DC for the District of Columbi a . 
FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Petrs are various county 
officials of Kleberg County, Te xas. The governi ng body o f the 
l1t GX3.~ 'tiff M C)},t~ I ;cf ~ we!lr J 




county is the Commissioners• Court, which consists of four 
Commissioners. Each Commissioner is elected by the voters of a 
separate commissioner's precinct in the county. The County 
Judge, who is elected at large, preside~ over the 
Commissioners• Court. 
Resps are Mexican Arner.ican citizens of Kleberg County. 
They brought this action in 1978, alleging that the 
apportionment plan for the four commissioners• precincts 
violated the one person, one vote rule and that it 
unconstitutionally diluted the votes of Mexican Americans in 
the county b~ placing most of them within one precinct. The DC 
(Cox, SD Tex) held that the plan violated the one person, one 
vote rule, but that it did not discriminate against Mexican 
Americans. The court ordered petrs to submit by November 13, 
1979, a proposed plan for reapportioning the county in 
accordance with its rulings. 
The Commissioners sought the assistance of a university 
professor, who presented a plan to them. They then voted to 
submit the plan to the court. The DC held that the plan 
remedied the malaportionment it had ·found and ordered that it 
be implemented for ' the 1980 prim~ry ap~ general elections. It 
rejected resps• argument that the plan should have been 
precleared by eith~r the Attorney General or the DC for the 
.. 
Dsitrict of Columbia pursuant to ' the Voting Right.; Act. 
Relying upon Bast Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 - -----1:£ 
- vC.. r · U.S. 636, 638-39 n.6 (1976), the court held that the plan was 
\ 
court-ordered rather than legislative. Since "[ a ] decree of 





Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act", Connor v. Johnson, 402 
u.s. 690, 691 (1971), the DC concluded that preclearance was 
not required. 
CA 5 vacated the DC's order approving the plan. It viewed 
........._ ----- --------- ---, 
Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 u.s. 535 (1978), as holding that "[a] 
proposed reapportionment plan submitted by a local legislative 
body does not lose its s tatus as a legislative rather than 
court-ordered plan merely because it is the product of 
litigation conducted in a federal forum." (Petn App at A-28). 
e_IJ t("" . 
Therefore, it concluded that the plan should be submitted fo r --
preclearance pursuant to §5 . 
..---........._ -----
After theCA's mandate issued, the DC ordered petrs to 
initiate the preclearance procedings. On August 14, 1980, Mr. 
Justice Powell entered an order recalling the mandate and 
staying the judgment bf the CA pending disposition of this 
petition. 49 L.W . . 3051. 
CONTENTIONS: Petrs state that there will be a substantial 
amount of reapportionment litigation following the 1980 census 
and that it is important for the Court to decide the 
circumstances in which reapportionment plans adopted as the 
result of litigation are subject to §5. They argue further 
.. • 
that the CA wrongly decfded that this plan was not a 
court-ordered one. / 
Petrs place primary reliance upon East Carrol l Parish 
School Board v. Marshall, supra, where the Court stated that 
"c~s resulting from equitable jurisdiction over 
adversary proceedings are not controlled by §5." 124 u.s. at 
638-39 n.6. Pe t r s contend tha t the same factors which the 
- 4 -
Court relied upon to find that the East Carroll plan was 
court-ordered rather than legislative are present here. Like 
the East Carroll police jury, the Kleberg County Commissioners' 
Court did not reapportion itself on its own authority. Both 
bodies acted in obedience to a court order. Neither body was 
authorized to reapportion itself absent a federal court order. 
Petrs were authorized by state law to alter voting precincts 
only in July or August, while the state law authorizing the 
East Carroll police jury to reapportion itself was invalid 
because it had not been· approved by the Attorney General 
pursuant to §5. 
Petrs contend that Wise v. Lipscomb, suora, relied upon by 
the CA, is d~sfinguishable. Wise found that the 
reapportionement plan of the Dallas City Council adopted after 
a judgment that the previous apportionment scheme was 
unconstitutional was a legislative rather than court-ordered 
plan. Therefore, the usual presumption against the creation of 
multi-member election districts in court-ordered plnns was not 
applicable. 
Petrs argue that under any of the standards suggested by 
the opinions in Wise, their plan is court-ordered rather than. 
legislative. In his opinion announcing the Court's judgment, 
Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, stated that 
the City Council had voted to reapportion itself voluntarily 
rather than merely submitting a plan for court approval. The 
opinion also stated .that the City Council was not pr ohibited by 
statute from reapportioning itself. Petrs argue th1t they did 
not adopt any plan, but voted only to submit a plan to the 
• 
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court, and that state law prohibited them f~om adjusting the 
precinct boundary lines. The opinion of Mr. Justice Powell 
~ 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment (joined by 
the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist) stated that the existence of state-law authorization 
was irrelevant. Those Justices concluded that the plan was 
-------
legislative because the City Council "exercised a legi s lat i ve --------- -----judgment, reflecting the pol.icy choices of the elected 
"--· -" --~ --.....___.-----------------
representatives of the people, rather than a remedial directive 
. '---- -- ---
of a federa l court." 437 U.S. at 548. Petrs argue that the 
court did not leave the adoption of a plan to the i r. discretion , 
so they exercised no legislative judgment in deciding whether 
to submit it to the court. The dissent of Mr. Justice 
Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Ju~tice 
Stevens, found no distincton between Wise and East. Carroll. 
Petrs argue that those Justices would find their plan to be 
legislative because this case is indistinguishable from East 
Carroll for the reasons stated above. 
Petrs also argue that the decision is inconsistent with 
Marshall v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927 (CAS 1978), ce~t. denied, 442 
U.S. 909 (1979). The court there held that a plan prepared by 
an outside expert and submitted to the DC in response to an 
order was court-ordered. 
Petrs final arguement is that submitting the plan for 
preclearance serves no useful purpose. When a new plan is 
adopted in respoonse to a court order, the court itself is abl e 
to evaluate the effect of that plan upon minoriti e s. Thus, 
there is no need for additional review b~ the Attorney General 
or the USDC for DC. 
- 6 -
Resps first note that petrs have pointed to no conflict 
among the circuits on this issue. The CA was not concerned 
about the alleged conflict with Marshall, since it denied 
rehearing en bane v1ithout recorded dissent. Resps also state 
that petrs argue matters not raised below, but never specify 
what these matters are. 
On the merits, resps argue that the statement in the East 
Carroll footnote relied upon by petrs is dictum, and that Wise 
eliminates the "confusion" caused by that dictum. In any 
event, this case is closer to Wise than East Carroll. Petrs 
submitted to the DC a plan that they wanted to adopt if the 
court would permit it. The DC did not impose these particular 
boundary lines upon petrs. In fact, the professor hired by 
petrs made several changes in his plan at their request. 
Unlike the plan in East Carroll, and like the one in Wise, 
petrs• plan violated no federal law. In addition, contrary to 
petrs• assertions, state law did permit them to adopt this 
plan. The law prohibits the redrawing of "election precincts" - ~ 
except during July and August. Tex. Elec. Code, art. 2.04. 
"Election precincts" are sub·-units of "commissioners• 
precincts''. Petrs' plan did not change the boundaries of any 
election precincts, although it did move some election 
precincts to different commissioners• precincts. Texas law 
permits the redistricting of commissioners• precincts at any 
time. Wilson v. Welle~, 214 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). 
Finally, resps argue that the legislative history of the 
Voting Rights Act indicates that §5 should apply in this case. 
'I'he Senate Report accompanying the 1975 Voting Rights Act 
- 7 -
Extension states that §5 review is inappropriate only when a 
court fashions a reapportionment plan itself because of the 
legislature's failure to devise one. If the le~islature 
submits its own . plan pursuant to court order, however, the 
Report states that the plan should be subject to §5. Sen Rep. 
No. 94-295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess, 18-19 (1975). 
DISCUSSION: The legislative history .cited by resps 
indicates that the CA reached the right result. The committee 
stated: "The one exception where Section 5 review would not 
ordinarily be available is where the court, because of exigent 
circumstances, actually fashions the plan itself instead of 
relying on a plan presented by a litigant." Sen. Report, supra 
at 19. The report stated that this was consistent with the 
Court's ruling in Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971), which 
involved such a- plan, and that for all other plans the 
committee intended to "utilize a form of primary jurisdiction 
for Section 5 review under which courts dealing with voting 
discrimination issues should defer in the first instance to the , 
Attorney General or to the District of Columbia District 
Court." Id., at 18. 
Petr's argument that this .added review is unnecessary is 
unpersuasive. The one person, one vote rule and the Voting 
Rights Act are aimed at different evils. It is possible for a 
plan to comply with the one person, one vote rule , yet still 
adversely a~fect the ~oting rights of minorities i n violation 
of §5. Thus, a DC's review of a plan for its compliance with 
.the one person, one vote rule does not guarantee protection of 
rights protected by the Voting :r:.ights Act. 
- 8 -
/ 
The CA's opinion may be in conflict with the broad 
---------
statement in the East Carroll footnote that court-ordered plans 
are not subject to §5, since the footnote appeared to consider 
a plan proposed by a legislature in response to a court order 
as a court-ordered one. Resp correctly observes, however, that 
the East Carroll footnote was unnecessary to the decision in 
that case. The Court in East Carroll held that a DC abused its 
discretion by imposing a ; eapportionment plan tha t called for 
multi-member districts as a remedy for a violation of the one 
person, one vote rule. The applicability of the \~ting Rights 
Act was not argued by any party, but by the government in an 
amicus brief. Wise (relied upon by the CA) and Marshall (cited 
by petrs) are al~o hot Voting Righ£s Act cases . 
. . ' 
It may be advisable to grant to resolve the conflict 
between the East Carroll footnote and the legislative history 
of the Voting Rights Act. On the other hand, a grant may be 
premature since no conflict among the circuits has developed 
yet. At the moment, the best course appears to be calling for ~ 
the views of the SG, since the government has an important role 
to play in the enforcement of §5. 
I recommend CVSG. 
There is a response. 
9/27/80 Dean Opns i n petn 
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2. 
a reapportionment plan drafted in response to an order of 
a federal district court and submitted to that court for 
approval. 
Background 
The background to this case is descr ibPd more 
fully in your opinion granting petitioner's application 
for a stay of the judgment of the Court of Appeal~. In 
brief, the background is this: 
Respondents challenged the boundary lines of the 
four county-commissioner precincts in Kleberg Country, 
Texas, on the ground that the precincts violated the one-
person, one-vote principle and unconstitutionally diluted 
the voting strength of Mexican-Americans. The District 
Court agreed with respondents' first challenge, but held 
that respondents had failed to prove their second. Upon 
the District Court's order that it draft a new 
apportionment plan, the members of the Commissioners' 
Court, petitioners here, hired a statistician to draft a 
plan, instructed and consulted with him durin~ his 
drafting, and then "officially adopted [his plan] at the 
Commissioners' Court meeting to be presented to the 
court." The District Court found that this plan corrected 
3. 
the one-person, one-vote violation, and it ordered the 
plan into effect. The District Court itself did not draft ----·------
any plan, nor did it appoint a Master or other official to 
draft a plan for it. But relying on East Carroll Parish 
School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 638-39 n.6 (1976) 
(per curiam), the District Court held that the new plan 
was judicial and that the plan therefore did not require 
preclearance under § 5. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Ctrcuit 
reversed. Relying on Justice White's opinion announcing 
the judgment of the fractured Court in Wise v. Lipscomb, 
437 U.S. 535 (1978), the Court of Appeals held that the 
reapportionment plan was a "legislative" plan which ,..ould 
not take effect without preclearance under § 5, despite 
the fact that the plan had been submitted to and approved 
by a federal district court in the course of litigation. ; , 
See Wise, 437 u.s., at 542 ("A new reapportionment plan 
enacted by a State, including one purportedly adopted in 
response to invalidation of the prior plan by a federal 
court, will not be considered 'effective as law,' 
until it has been submitted and has received clearance 
under § 5.") Upon petitioners' application, you then 
stayed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the ground 
4. 
that there is a substantial question under this Court's 
precedents whether the plan in this case requires § 5 
preclearance. 1 Compare East Carroll, supra, with Wise, 
supra, and id. (White, J.) with id. (Powell, J.). 'T'he 
Court granted a writ of certiorari because of the 





lour opinion granting a stay suggested that the ~ ;-
Commissioners' Court might not have had legislative power A~~J.~ 
to draft a new apportionment plan. Petitioners argue in rr~ 
their brief that they did not have power. It is clear, 1.. ~/.i ~ , 
however, that Texas law does not restrict the power~ the /~' 
Commissioners' Court to re-Oraft "comm1ss1oner prec1nct" 
lines. Article 5 of the Texas Constitution authorizes a 
Commissioners' Court to divide a county into commissioner 
precints "from time to time, for the convenience of the 
people." Tex. Const. Ann. art. 5, § 18 (Vernon 1955). 
Texas courts has construed this power to be "plan and 
simple, and without condition of restriction." State v. 
Rigsby, 43 S.W. 271, 273 (Tex. Ct. Civ. Appp. 1897). 
The restriction invoked by petitioners on the 
Commissioners' Court's power is against changing "election 
precinct" lines other than in July or August terms. See 
Tex. Elec. Code Ann. art. 2.04 (1) (Vernon Supp. 1979) 
(restricting "changes in election precincts" to the July 
or August term) . Election precincts merely determine 
where citizens are to vote, and the restriction is to 
avoid confusing voters as to polling places immediately 
before an election. Thus, the Commissioners' Court .did 
have authorit 0 dra the plan that it suomitted to the 
Dis r1ct urt in this case. 
5. 
Discussion 
The law that has developed in the wake of 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 u.s. 533 (1964), and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 seems unusually prone to concepts which 
appear to be alike but are not. The label "vote 
d_!~on," for example, has been used to describe both the 
one-person, one-vote problem at issue in Reynolds and the -------------
less mathematical problem at issue in last Term's City of 
Mobile v. Bolden, u.s. (1980); but those two 
problems are quite distinct. This case is another 
instance in which two distinct problems appear alike, for 
the question whether a reapportionment plan is 
"legislative" or "judicial" may be relevant either where 
an appellate court reviews the use of multimember 
districts in a reapportionment plan or where a court--
trial or appellate--orders preclearance under § 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act. The question is the same in each 
context, but the answers may differ depending on context. 
question ----
In the case now before the Court, the only 
is whether the reapportionment plan is 
"legislative" or "judicial" in the context of § 5 
preclearance. Nonetheless, I believe that it may help our 
analysis to trace the history of this distinction in both 
.. :~. 
6. 
contexts. My conclusion is that the reapportionment plan 
in this case must be precleared under § 5 before the~-
 ~--------------------------------------Commissioners' Court can put it into effect. 
from 
1. The "Legislative"-"Judicial" Distinction 
This Court first distinguished "legislative" 
"judicial" reapportionment plans in ~nor v. 
Johnson, 402 u.s. 690 (1970). Much of the confusion now 
attending the distinction may result from the fact that 
the distinction arose in Johnson both in the context of a 
challenge relying on § 5 and a challenge attacking 
multimember districts. In that case, a federal district 
court had invalidated the latest reapportionment statute 
of the Mississippi Legislature, and the parties to the 
litigation had submitted four different plans to remedy 
the one-person, one-vote violation. All four plans 
exclusively used single-member districts. The district 
court then "issued its own plan, which included single-
and multi-member districts." 402 U.S., at 691. Some of 
the parties sought a stay from this Court, claiming that 
the district court's plan should have used single-member 
districts exclusively and should have been precleared 
under § 5. 
7. 
In a per curiam opinion, the Court addressed 
both challenges. The Court's complete answer to the § 5 
----- challenge was this: "A decree of the United States 
/1~~, f District Court __ is not w~n reach of ~
VFV v ---- ---------·-----------
j_.u Voting Rights Act." 402 U.S., at 691. To the challenge fP -/ ~
against multimember districts, the Court stated: "We 
agree that when district courts are forced to fashion 
apportionment plans, single-member districts are 
preferable to large multi-member districts as a general 
matter." Id., at 692. The Court therefore granted a stay 
and instructed the district court, "absent insurmountable 
difficulties, to devise and put into effect a single-
member district plan." Id. The dissenting Justices 
disagreed with the Court's instructions against the use of 
multi-member districts, but they agreed with the Court's 
disposition of the § 5 challenge. The dissenters stated, , , 
in an opinion by Justice Black: -~~ ~ 
Needless to say I completely agree with the ~ ~ 
holding of the majority that a r_eapporti~ment ~  
plan form':!_~ and ordered by a fe eral .~-:­
distric~urt~need no € ~ appr o ve d b~he ~ ~-
un1 tea States At orney enera or the United  
States District Court for the District of 
Columia. Under our ~6nstitutional system it 
would be strange indeed to construe § 5 •.• to 
require that actions of a federal court be 
stayed and reviewed by the Attorney General or 
the United States District Court for the 
8. 
District of Columbia. Id., at 695. 
In sum, the Court made two holdings in Johnson. 
First, a "decree" of a federal district court which the ~1-zw-­
dissent read to mean a "plan f ?Jm'2:late,d ~~ orde~ by a \ ....,~~--£Q 
federal district court" -- does not require preclearance } ~-
---~ '~ under § 5. An unmistakeable concern for separation of 
powers between executive and judiciary underlay this 
holding. Second, a federal district court that is 
compelled by circumstances to formulate and order an 
apportionment plan should avoid the use of multimember 
districts if at all possible. Underlying this holding was 
the typical amalgam of concern and restraint that prompts 
the Court to impose firmer standards on federal district 
courts, pursuant to a general supervisory power, than the 
Constitution imposes upon the States. The concern was 
that multimember districts tend to "dilute" the voting 
strength of minorites, as previously recognized in Fortson 
v. Dorsey, 379 u.s. 433 (1965), Burns v. Richardson, 386 
U.S. 120 (1967), and other cases. The restraint arose 
from the conclusion of Fortson and Burns that multimember 
districts are not per se unconstitutional, despite their 
tendency, and that state legislatures therefore are not 
9. 
forbidden from using them in the plans that they 
formulate.2 Thus, each of the two holdings in Johnson 
depended on the distinction made by this Court between 
legislative and judicial plans. 
In the context of a plan using multimember 
districts, the distinction arose again in several cases. 
See Connor v. Williams, 404 u.s. 549, 551 (1972) (~ 
curiam): Mahan v. Howell, 410 u.s. 315, 333 (1973): 
2In a case subsequent to Johnson, the Court explained at 
more length this exercise of supervisory power: 
In Connor v. Johnson, •.. which came to us on an 
appl1cation for a stay, we were presented with a 
court-ordered reapportionment scheme having some 
multimember districts in both bodies of the 
state legislature. Exercising our 
supervisory power, we directed the District 
Court to devise a single-member districging 
plan, 'absent insurmountable circumstances.' 
* * * 
The standards for evaluating the use of 
multimember districts thus clearly differ 
depending on whether a federal court or a state 
legislature has initiated the use ...• When the 
plan is court ordered, there often is no state 
pol icy of multimember distr icting which might 
deserve respect or deference. Indeed, if the 
court is imposing multimember districts upon a 
State which always has employed single-member 
districts, there is special reason to follow the 
Connor rule favoring the latter type of 
districting. 
Chapman v. Meier, 420 u.s. 1, 17-19 (1975) (emphasis in 
original). 
10. 
Chapman v. Meier, 420 u.s. 1, 17-19 (1975). The 
distinction in the context of § 5 preclearance arose less 
often. See Connor v. Waller, 421 u.s. 656 (1975) (~ 
curiam). But in East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. 
Marshall, 424 u.s. 636 (1976), the distinction again arose 
in both contexts simultaneously. In the context of 
multimember districts, the Court merely "reaffirmed the 
rule that when United States district courts are put to 
the task of fashioning reapportionment plans to supplant 
concededly invalid state legislation, single-member 
districts are to be preferred absent unusual 
circumstances." 424 U.S., at 639. In the context of § 5 
preclearance, the Court's holding is less lucid. 
V' 
In footnote 6 of East Carroll, the Court noted 
that the Solicitor General had argued in an amicus brief 
that the preclearance proc~dures of § 5 "must be complied , 
with prior to adoption by a federal district court of a 
reapportionment plan submitted to it on behalf of a local 
legislative body that is covered by the Act." 424 U.S., 
at 638, n. 6. Although the issue had not been raised by 
the parties, the Court stated that it "agree[d] with the 
Court of Appeals that court-ordered plans resulting 
from equitable jurisdiction over adversary proceedings are 
11. 
not controlled by § 5. Had the East Carroll police jury 
<---
reapportioned itself on its own authority, clearance under -----
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act would clearly have been 
--- --------------required." Id. The Court then noted that the police jury 
had not purported to reapportion itself of its own 
authority and probably lacked authority to do so. The 
Court concluded, "Since the reapportionment scheme was 
submitted and adopted pursuant to court order, the 
preclearance procedures of § 5 do not apply. Connor v. 
Johnson, 402 u.s. 690, 691 (1971) ." Id. 
This footnote holds more than Johnson held. The 
reapportionment plan that the Court coqsidered "judicial" 
in Johnson was one that the district court itself had 
ormulated and issued in the face of plans submitted by 
the legislative body in the case. The reapportionment 
issue in the case now before the Court, for the district 
court in East Carroll had ordered the parties to submit 
reapportionment plans and then had adopted one of those 
plans. See Zimmer v. McKeithen, 467 F.2d 1381, 1382 (CAS 
1972), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. 
Marshall, supra. Thus, when the Court in Johnson held 
that the plan which had been "formulated and ordered" by 








the district court was a judicial plan, it used "ordered" 
in the strict sense of "issued," "filed," or, to use the 
word of the Court, "decree[d] ." But when the Court in 
East Carroll held that the plan was judicial because it 
was "court-:ordered," it meant merely that the court had 
ordered the parties to formulate a plan. 
This inconsistency in the Court's notion of a 
"court ordered" plan contributed to the fracturing of 
opinion in Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978), which 
involved the distinction between legislative and judicial 
plans in the context of multimember districts. It seems 
II~ 
clear that both Justice White's opinion and your opinion~"" ,, 
aimed to return the d.ef ini tion of 'j udicial plans·~ for ~~~..{~ 
purpose of reviewing the use of multimember districts,~;~~-~ ' 
the narrow definition implicit in Johnson. The opinions 
./ 
divided on the question of how to read East Carroll. 
Justice White read it to hold that legislatures that lack 
legal authority to reapportion themselves cannot devise 
legislative plans. Id., at 545. You read East Carroll to 
hold only that the plan submitted by the legislature 
there, although otherwise legislative, properly was 
subjected to the stricter standard accorded judicial plans 
because the legislature's judgment had been found by the 
13. 
Attorney General to the tainted. Id., at 549. 
Underlying both ~inions in Wise is the " ---- --·----- -
conviction that reapportionment is a task for 
leg~ot ·-d1stric~~~rts. Because the opinions 
---.......,.__ -----
shared this conviction, they both cited the principle that 
"a State's freedom of choice to devise substitutes for an 
apportionment plan found unconsti tutuional, either as a 
whole or in part, should not be restricted beyond the 
clear commands of the Equal Protection Clause." Burns v. 
Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 85 (1966). See Wise, 437 U.S., 
at 540 (White, J.); id., at 548 (Powell, J.). The 
important point for our present purposes is that this ________________________________ '-----__________________ _ 
statement pertains only to the distinction between 
legislative and judicial plans in the context of reviewing 
a plan using multimember districts. Where the question is 
whether a plan may use multimember districts, the respect ~ 
~~ 
due to legislative judgments warrants a narrow definition 
of judicial plans. Thus, a legislative judgment that 
multimember districts are appropriate should not be 
ignored simply because that judgment is embodied in a plan 
submitted to a district court. Only plans that do not 
reflect any legislative judgment that is, plans 
actually "formulated" and "decree[d]" by the district 
14. 
court itself, Johnson, 402 u.s. 691, 695 -- should be 
considered judicial and therefore should be subjected to 
the stricter standard against multimember districts. 
This conviction that legislative judgment must 
be respected is significantly less appropriate when the 
question is whether a plan is legislative or judicial in 
the context of § 5 preclearance. By congressional 
declaration, a different conviction must underlie the 
definition of legislative and judicial in this context. 
Congress has declared through the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, and its several reenactments, that local legislative 
judgments about election districts and practices do not 
deserve a presumptive respect. The preclearance 
requirements of § 5 are Congress' means of restricting 
local legislative judgments. This Court has recognized 
and upheld that congressional purpose and means. South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966). 
This history -- which has become longer than I 
intended it to be -- reveals several things. First, this 
history reveals why petitioners, a legislative body, have 
taken in this case the self-effacing position that a plan 
drafted upon their instructions and adopted by them is a 
judicial plan. I call this position "self-effacing" 
15. 
because I dare say that petitioners would characterize 
their plan as legislative, under exactly the same facts, 
if this case involved a review of multimember districts 
rather than § 5 preclearance. I say this for the simple 
~-' 
reason that what is at stake Ain defining "legislative" and 
"judicial" differs in the two contexts. The scope of the 
I ti l"- ,, 
definition of egislative pla~' (or judicial plan) has 
precisely the opposite effect in the context of § 5 
preclearance than it has in the context of multimember 
districts. When the question is whether a plan is subject 
to § 5 preclearance, a broad definition of "legislative" 
places more plans within the reach of § 5; that is, it 
takes freedom of choice from the legislatures. When the 
question is whether a plan using multimember districts is 
subject to a strict review, then a broad definition of 
"legislative" preserves more plans from that review; that 
is, it preserves freedom of choice in the legislatures. 
Petitioners in this case desire their freedom of choice; 
they therefore argue that the plan they drafted and 
submitted is "judicial." 
Second, this history reveals that~§T~· 
has rna contains the only holding that the Court 
judicial plans and § 5 preclearance. The Court expressly 
16. 
held only that judicial plans are exempted from § 5 
preclearance, but it implicitly held that "judicial" is 
defined only as broadly as necessary to avoid the 
separation-of-powers problem inherent if the Attorney 
General were to sit in review of a court decision. A 
corrollary to this conclusion is that petitioners' 
reliance in this case upon dicta broadly defining "court-
ordered" in East Carroll is dubious. 
Third, this history ironically reveals that the 
appropriate place to begin our analysis in this case is 
with § 5 itself, not with the Court's precedents. If this 
case involved the review of a plan using multimember 
districts, then this case would raise questions that 
spring from the judicial distrust of multimember 
districts: questions of constitutionality, 
presumptiveness of respect for legislative judgment, and 
general supervisory power. This Court's precedents 
provide the appropriate starting point to answer those 
questions. 
11 \.' 
But this case 1nvolves § 5 preclearance, and 
-----------------~~---------------
it therefore raises a question of statutory construction: 
did Congress intend that plans developed in the 
circumstances of this case be subject to § 5? Our 
analysis of this question must begin with the language and 
17. 
legislative history of § 5. 
2. Language and Legislative History of § 5 
Preclearance 
Having concluded that the important question in 
this case is Congress' intent, I find the answer to be ---·---clear: The language and legislative history of § 5 
~iiusively show that petitioners' plan is subject to the ,_ ___________________ ___ 
preclearance requirements of § 5 before it can take -------------effect.3 Arguing as an amicus, the Solicitor General 
presents the argument for this position quite well. In 
brief, the argument is this: 
Section 5 contains no qualifying language. It 
requires preclearance -- either by the Attorney General or 
by a three-judge panel of the District Court for the 
3The plan concededly satisfies the technical 
requirements to fall within the scope of § 5. First, 
Kleberg County is a covered jurisdiction within the 
meaning of § 4 (a) of the Act, and therefore the 
requirement of § 5 applies to it. Second, a 
reapportionment plan such as the plan in this case 
qualifies as a "standard, practice, or procedure with 
respect to voting" covered by § 5. Georgia v. United 
States, 411 U.S. 526, 529 (1973). Finally, the plan 
subm~tted by petitioner differs from the districting plan 
in effect on November 1, 1972, the significant date for 
purposes of § 5 preclearance of plans in Texas. 
_.:/ 
18. 
District of Columbia "[w]henever" a 
jurisdiction "shall enact or seek to administer" any new 
voting qualification, standard, or practice. 
It is argued that the plan is this case is not 
one which a covered jurisdiction seeks to institute, for 
the plan was submitted to the district court. There are 
two answers to this argument. First, the fact that the 
legislature submitted the plan to the district court 
pursuant to order does not diminish the fact that the 
legislature "seek[s] to administer" the plan. Thus, the 
........ ~ ------
plain language of § 5 can be said to compell the 
conclusion that this plan must be precleared before it can 
gq,,.-i nto effect. 
/ 
Second, the legislative history expressly 
/ states that a plan such as the plan in this case must be 
precleared. 
The persuasive legislative history resides in 
the Senate Report that accompanied Congress's reenactment 
of the Voting Rights Act in 1975. S.Rep. No. 94-295, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). In the report, Congress 
expressed its understanding of the scope of the 
preclearance requirement when a covered jurisdiction 
19. 
submits a plan to a district court: 
In the typical case, the court either will 
direct the governmental body to adopt a new plan 
and present it to the court for consideration or 
else itself choose a plan from among those 
presented by various parties to the litigation. 
In either situation, the court should defer its 
consideration of--or selection among--any plans 
presented to it until such time as these plans 
have been submitted for Section 5 review. Only 
after such review should the district court 
proceed to any remaining fourteenth or fifteenth 
amendment questions that may be raised. 
Id., at 18-19. In the same report, Congress also 
expressed its understanding of this Court's exemption from 
preclearance for "judicial" plans: 
Id. 
of § 
The one exception where Section 5 review 
would not ordinarily be available is where the 
court, because of exigent circumstances, 
actually fashions the plan itself instead of 
relying on a plan presented by a litigant. This 
is the limited meaning of the 'court decree' 
exception recognized in Connor v. Johnson, 402 
u.s. 690 (1971). Even in these cases, however, 
if the governmental body subsequently adopts a 
plan patterned after the court's plan, Section 5 
review would be required, Connor v. Waller, [421 
U.S. 656 (1975) (per curiam)]. Furthermore, in 
fashioning the plan, the court should follow the 
appropriate Section 5 standards, including the 
body of administrative and judicial precedents 
developed in Section 5 cases. 
In sum, the language and the legislative history 




subject to § 5 remains subject to § 5 even though it is ----- ---·-----submitted to a district court pursuant to court order. 
Having reached this conclusion upon statutory 
construction, it now is appropriate to look again at this 
Court's precedents. Without launching again into the 
cases, I reach the following conclusions: 
Johnson suggests the proper scope of the 
exemption from § 5 preclearance. Only those plans which 
actually are formulated by the district court and imposed 
upon the local legislature by court decree may take effect 
without preclearance under § 5. Of course, district 
courts should undertake to formulate and impose their own 
plans only in exigent circumstances. But when district 
courts must undertake that task, the separation-of-powers 
principle bars the Attorney General from sitting in review 
of such plans.4 
~t-
East Carroll is inconsistent with Johnson. Its  -----.... -
4 It is not literally separation-of-powers that bars a 
three-judge panel of the District Court for the District 
of Columbia from sitting in review of a plan formulated by 
a district court of another district. I suppose that 
Congress could provide for such review by statute. But 
Congress has not done so explicitly, and such a unique 
grant of jurisdiction should not be inferred from the 
Voting Rights Act. 
------
21. 
dicta in footnote 6 either should be rejected or should be 
branded as the mere dicta that it is. Alternatively, your 
opinion in Wise read 5 East Carroll 
'\ 
on turning "as 
~ 
its 
peculiar facts." It could be read similarly in this case. 
Wise lends support to the conclusion that the 
---- ----
plan in this case must be precleared under § 5. Although 
your opinion avoided co-mingling a 
legislative-judicial distinction in 
Justice White's opinion did not. 
discussion 
the two 
of the ' '~-= __ .'' 
contexts,
In the course of 
suggesting why a federal district court might be forced to 
draft its own reapportionment plan, Just ice White 
suggested that a district court might draft a plan for 
interim use while a plan drafted by the legislature is 
under consideration for § 5 preclearance. Justice White 
stated: "A new reapportionment plan enacted by a State, 
including one purportedly adopted in response to 
invalidation of the prior plan by a federal court, will 
not be considered 'effective as law,' until it has 
been submitted and has received clearance under § 5. 
Neither, in those circumstances, until clearnace has been 
obtained, should a court address the constitutionality of 
the new measure." 437 u.s., at 542. 
22. 
3. Practical Considerations 
Petitioners raise in their support several 
practical considerations. Principally, they contend that 
a plan adopted in response to a court order, such as in 
this case, should not require preclearance under § 5 
because the district court itself can evaluate the effect 
of the plan upon minorities. 
the purpose of § 5 already 
Thus, petitioners contend, 
is satisfied and no need 
remains for review by the Attorney General or the District 
Court for the District of Columbia. I believe that the 
Solicitor General adequately refutes this argument. Most 
importantly, the Solicitor General notes that petitioners' 
suggestion simply does not comport with the statutory 
scheme that Congress enacted. See S. Rep. No. 94-295, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), at 18-19 (characterizing § 5 
as establishing "a form of primary jurisdiction for ~ ' 
Section 5 review"). 
Conclusion 
I conclude that the plan in this case is subject 
to the preclearance requirement of § 5. I therefore 
recommend affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAmJ 
No. 80-180 
W. C. McDaniel et al l Petitioners,· ., On Writ of Certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the 
v. Fifth Circuit. 
Jose Sanchez et al. 
[June - , 1981] 
JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ ~ 
We granted certiorari to decide whether the preclearance A 
requirement of § q of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as ~ "'F- , 
amended/ applies to a reapportionment plan submitted to a~ W ~ V 
1 The Voting Rights Act was enacted in 1965, 79 Stat . 437, and was -:---
amended in 1970, 84 Stat. 314, and in 1975, 89 Stat. 400. In relevant / _ J.. _ .. A 
part, § 5 now provides: ~
"[W]henever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the 
prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a) of this title based upon determi-
in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or pre- J'O; " 
nations made under the third sentence of section 1973b (b) of this title are J 
requisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to ~
voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such 
State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District r'"" 
Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such 
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have 
the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right 
to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees 
set forth in section 1973b (f) (2) of this title, and unless and until the 
court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote 
for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, prac-
tice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, stand-
ard, ptactice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the 
qualification, prerequisite, sta12dard, practice, or procedure has been sub-
mitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State 
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Federal District Court by the legislative body of a covered 
jurisdiction 2 in response to a judicial determination that the 
existing apportionment of its electoral districts is unconsti-
tutional. Relying on East Carroll Parish School Board v. 
Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 (per curiam), the District Court held 
that the plan submitted to it in this case was a judicial plan 
and thus excepted from the requirements of § 5. Relying on 
Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U. S. 535, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit reversed; it held that because the plan had been 
prepared by a legislative body, it was a legislative plan within 
the coverage of § 5. We are persuaded that Congress in-
tended to require compliance with the statutory preclearance 
procedures under the circumstances of this case. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Allppeals. 
The covered jurisdiction in this case is Kleberg County, a, 
interposed an obj('ction within sixty days after such submission, or upon 
good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited npproval within sixty days 
after such submission, the Att<Jrney General has affirmatively indicated 
that such objection will not be made." 89 Stat. 400, 404, 42 U. S. C. 
f 1973c. 
2 Section 4 of the Act identifies the jurisdictions that are subject to the 
Act's prohibitions. One of the det('rminants of coveruge is the use of a 
"test or device" as a. prerequisite for registration or voting. See 42 
U.S. C. § 1973b (b), (c). In 1975, Congress enlarged the coverage of the 
Act by changing the rlefinition of "t('st or device" to protect non-English 
speaking citizens who constitute more than 5% of the voting age popula-
tion in any jurisdiction. The amendment provides: 
"In addition to the meaning given the term under subsection (c) of 
this section, the term 't('st or device' shall also mean any practice or re-
quirement by which any State or political subdivision provided any regis-
tration or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials 
or information relating to the electoral proc('SS, including ballots, only in 
the English languagP, where the Director of the Census determines that 
more than five p('r centum of the citizens of voting age re~:>iding in such 
State or political subdivision are members of a single language minority." 
89 Stat. 400, 401-402, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (f) (3). 
As a result of thi::; amendment, Texas and its political subdivisions became 
covered jurisdictions. See Briacoe v. Bell, 432 U. S. 404. 
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rural county in Texas. Under Texas law, a Commissioners 
Court, which is composed of four county commissioners pre· 
sided over by the county judge, is authorized to govern Kle· 
berg County. The county is divided periodically by the 
Commissioners Court into four commissioners' precincts, each 
of which elects a resident to the position of county commis· 
sioner. The county judge is elected at-large. The county 
commissioners and the county judge serve 4-year terms.3 
In January of 1978, four Mexican-American residents of 
Kleberg County brought this class action against various 
county officials alleging that the apportionment of the four 
commissioners' precincts denied individual residents of the 
larger precincts a vote of equal weight, and unconstitution-
ally diluted the voting strength of the county's substantial 
Mexican-American population.4 After a trial,5 the District 
Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the county's appor-
tionment plan unconstitutionally diluted the voting power of 
Mexican-Americans as a class, but held that individual voters 
3 See generally Tex. Canst., Art. 5, § 18 ; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 
2351 (Vernon 1971). Elections are staggered in the four precincts so that 
two commissioners are elected every two years. 
4 The District Court certified two classes of Kleberg County voters as 
plaintiffs: ( 1) the class of all registered voters who were denird a vote 
of equal weight in the election of county commissioners due to the mal-
apportionment of the commi~sioners' precincts ; and (2) the class of all 
Mexicar1-American voters whose voting power had been diluted under the 
Kleberg County apportionment plan. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A-2, A-4. 
0 In February of 1978, the District Court had refused to grant the 
plaintiffs preliminary relief enjoining the May 1978 primary elections, 
relying in part on the uncertainty of the statistical data presented by the 
plaintiffs to establish their claim of malapportioument. After the primary 
election, the Court of Appeals vacated the Di~trict Court's order denying 
a preliminary injunction and remanded for reconsideration in the light of 
its decision in Lister v. Commissioners Court, 566 F. 2d 490 (1978), which 
held that a Commissioners Court "had a clear duty to reapportion on the 
basis of the 1970 Census." !d., at 492. Upon remand, the case proceeded 
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were denied equal representation because of the substantial 
disparity in the number of residents in each commissioners' 
precinct.6 The District Court therefore directed the county 
officials to submit a proposed reapportionment plan to · the 
court within 6 weeks, and scheduled a hearing on the validity 
of the proposal for 4 weeks thereafter.7 
Pursuant to the District Court's order, the Commissioners 
Court undertook the task of devising a new apportionment 
plan. _The Commissioners Court employed Dr. Robert Nash, 
a statistician a.nd the Dean of the ·college of Business at 
Texas A & I University, to prepare a new plan, instructing 
him to define the commissioners' precincts "on a one-person/ 
one-vote basis." 8 With one insignificant modification,0 the 
0 The 1970 census indieaterl that Kleberg County had 8:5,166 ret;ident~ . 
]f the precinct boundaries had been · drawn to achieve perfect population 
equality, each precinct would have · had · 8,291 residents. In fact, how-
ever, the !Hrgest precinct contained 9,928 reHidf.'ntH a1id the ~malle;;t only 
6,702. The maximum deviation from the lar!);est precinct to the smallest 
waH therefore 38.9%. Sec App. to · Pet. for Cert. A...:5 . ThiH apportion-
ment plan had been a:dopted in 1968, aud the precincts had not been re-
apportioned following the 1970 cen~us. 
7 In ordering the defendant:; to submit a proposed n·apportionment 
plan , the District Court notfd: "The initial ·burden of faHhioning a con-
stitutionally permissible remedy is on the County Commi~~:>ioners Court:" 
App. to Pet. for Cert. A-19. 
8 Although the Commissioner~:~ Court employed Dr. Nash, he was not 
given extensive in;;tructions with re:;pect to preparation of the reapportion~ 
ment plan. Dr. Nasli's testimony in the Di:;trict Court reveals that the 
plan's deh[ils were left JargPiy within his discretion: 
"Q. What instructions did you receive at the time of notification from 
Judge McDaniel in reference to drafting the new plan? 
"A. They wanted it broken down on a one-person/one-vote basi:; and 
that was the extent of thr~ir input on how I would do it." Joint Appendix 
25. 
The Commi~:~sioners Court did not ask Dr. Nash to take into considera~ 
tion geographical boundaries, previous county maintenance district~:>, or the-
[Footnote D iii on TJ· 5] 
.· 
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Commissioners Court officially adopted the plan prepared by 
Dr. Nash as the plan it would submit to the District Court. 
Respondents objected to the proposed plan. They chal-
lenged the data used by the Dean, they claimed that the 
plan diluted the voting strength of Mexican-Americans, and 
they contended that the Voting Rights Act required the 
county to obtain preclearance from the Attorney General of 
the United States or the United ~tates District Court for the 
District of Columbia before the plan could become effective.10 
After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court rejected both 
of respondents' factual conten.tions, and held as a matter of 
law that the Voting Rights Act did not re~uire preclear•ance, 
The court entered an order approving the new plan and au .. 
thorizing the Commissioners Court to conduct the 1980 pri-
mary and general elections under it. r3ee App. to Pet. fol' 
Cert. A...:.21 to A-23, 
Without expressing any opinion with respect to the con-
stitutionality of the new plan, the Court of Appeals vacated 
·the District Court's orCler in a per curictm opinicm. See 615 
F. 2d 1023 (1980). 'Reasoning that "[a] proposed reappor-
tionment plan submitted by a local·tegislative ·body does not 
lose its status as a legislative rather than court-ordered plan 
·merely 'because ·it is tbe proCluct of litigation conducted in a 
federal forum," 615 F. 2d, at 10Z4, the Court of Appeals held 
that the Voting Rights Act required preclearance. ·The cour·t 
thereafter denied petitioners' application for a stay pending 
tthnic balance of individual precinct~:> . Id., a.t 26. In drafting the piau, 
Dr. Nash wa~:> primarily inftueuced by population consideration~:> ; he al~:>o 
attempted to stay within the boundarie~:> of exi~:>ting voting precincts as 
much as possible. U., at '29-30. 
9 After Dr. Nash submitted his proposal, the Commissioners Court asked 
him to redraw one ''boundary in order to locate the county courthouse in 
Precinct One instead of Pre('inct Four. Because there were no residen~ 
vn the on'ly blo& affected by this change, see Joint Appedix 28, no ,one-
eontends that it was signitiean-t:for .rwrposes of this litigation. 
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filing. and consideration of a petition for writ of certiorari. 
Ori August 14, 1980, however, JusTICE PowELL, in his capac-
ity as Circuit Justice, entered an order recalling the mandate 
and staying the judgment of the Court of Appeals pending 
disposition of the petition for certiorari. - U. S. -. ·We 
granted that petition because the question presented is im-
portant and because the answer suggested by our prior opin-
ions is not free of ambiguity. - U. S. -.11 
In this Court, the county officials contend ,that the Voting 
Rights Act does not apply to a 'plan that "(a) was prepared 
and presented in response to an order by ·the · district court, 
(b) was not prepared by county officials but by a third party 
expert, (c) was not adopted by the county before submission 
to the court, (d) was considered by the trial court to be court-
ordered, and (e) was put into effect only after county officials 
were ordered to do so by the trial court." 12 
We first consider the significance of the distinction be-
tween legislative and court-ordered plans as identified in our 
prior cases. We then review our decisions in East Carrdll 
and Wise v. Lipscomb, on which the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals respective1y placed primary reliance. Fi-
nally, we examine the statute and its legislative history. 
I 
Texas and its political subdivisions are covered by the 
Voting Rights Act. Briscoe v. Bel1, 432 U. S. 404Y Section. 
5 of that Act is applicable whenever a covered jurisdiction 
11 As JusTICE PowELL noted in granting petitioners' application for a 
stay: 
"It is fair to say that the opinions in PJtJst Carroll and Wise v. Lipscorrib 
fall considerably short of iJrovidiflg deltr guidance to the courts that 
initially address this difficnit issue. It would be helpful, therefore, for 
this Court to exercise its responsibility to provide such 3Uidance." 
U.S., at-. 
12 Pet. for Cert. I; see also Brief for Petitioners II. 
13 See n. 2, supra. 
,, 
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"shall enact or seek to adminisrer any voting qualification or 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure 
with respect to voting different . from that in force or effect 
on November 1, 1972 .... " 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. A reap-
portionment plan is a "standard, practice, or procedure with 
. 'respect to voting" within the .meaning of § 5, Georgia v. 
,United States, 411 U. S. 526, 531-535, and it is undisputed 
that Kleberg County is a covered jurisdiction. What is in 
_dispute is whether that jurisdiction did . "enact or seek to ad-
minister" a proposed reapportionment plan when it presented 
that plan to a Federal District Court as a proposed remedy 
for a constitutional violation . . If the statute does apply, 
then the plan must be precleared either by the Attorney Gen-
eral of the Unired States or the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia before it may .become effective.14 
In such a preclearance proceeding, it is not sufficient to dem-
onstrate that the new plan is constitutional; the covered 
jurisdiction also has the burden of demonstrating that the 
~istricting changes are not motivared by a discriminatory 
purpose and will not have -an adverse impact on minority 
voters. See, e. g., City of Rorne v. United States, 446 U. S. 
156, 172-173. 
Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. First, the Act 
tequires preclearance of new legislative apportionment plans 
that are adopted without judicial direction or approval. See 
Georgia v. United States, supra. Second, the Act's preclear-
ance requirement does not apply to plans prepared and 
adopted by a federal court to remedy a constitutional viola-. 
tion. See Connor v. Johnson, 402 U. S. 690 (per curiarn) .111 
14 In our prior decisions construing the Act , we have described in detail 
the preclearance procedures. See, e. g., Allen v. State Board of Elections, 
393 U. S. 544; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301; Georgia v. 
United States, 411 U. S. 526 ; Morris v. Gressette, 432 U. S. 491. 
15 In Johnson, the Court summarily -rejected the suggestion that an. 
~pportlonmen~ pl:;~n .Jo,rmulated by a federal court must be subrnitteu for 
vreclearancc under§ 5: 
·' 
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Petitioners contend that the Act does not apply to this reap .. 
portionment plan because it is a court-ordered plan, whil~ 
respondents argue that the Act does apply because the plan 
was prepared and submitted on behalf of the local legislative 
body. 
In prior reapportionment cases not arising under the Vot-
ing Rights Act, we have recognized important differences be-
tween legislative plans and court-ordered plans. Because 
"reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of 
the State through its legislature or other body, rather than 
of a federal court," Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 27, the 
Court has tolerated somewhat greater flexibility in the fash-
ioning of legislative remedies for violation of the one-person/ 
one-vote rule than when a federal court prepares its own 
remedial decree. Thus, in Chapman we held "that unless 
there are persuasive justifications, a court-ordered reappor-
tionment plan of a state legislature must avoid use of multi-
member districts, and, as we1l, must ordinarily achieve the 
goal of population equality with little more than de minimis 
variation." !d., at -26-27 (footnote omitted).16 In contrast, 
reapportionment plans prepared by legis1a.tive bodies may 
employ multimember districts and may result in greater pop-
ulation disparities than would be permitted in a court-ordered 
"A decree of the tJuite(l States District Court is not within reach of 
Section 5 of the Voting ttights Act.t' 402 U. S., at 891. 
In his dissenting opinion in Johnson, Justice Black added: 
"Needless to say I completely agree with the holding of the majority 
that a reapportionment plan formulated and ordered by a federal district 
court need not be approved by the United State~ Attorney General or the 
United States District Court for the Di~trict ot Columbia. Under our 
constitutional system it would be strange indeed' to construe § 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1985, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U. S. C. § l973c (1984 ed., 
Supp. V) , to require that actions ot a federal court be stayed and reviewed 
by the Attorney General or d1e United States Dil:ltrict Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia." 402 U. S., at 695. 
16 Cnap'man involved reapportionment of the legislature of North· 
Dakota, a jutisdictiol'l that is l!Ot cov-ered by the Voting Rights Act. 
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plan. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 414-415. Cf. 
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. 8. 315. 
In this case, we are concerned only with the question 
whether the reapportionment plan submitted to the District 
Court should be considered a legislative plan for purposes of 
preclearance under § 5. We are not presented with any 
question concerning the substantive acceptability of that 
plan. Nonetheless, we draw significant guidance from priott 
cases in which the substantive acceptability of a reapportion-
ment plan, :rather than the applicability of § 5, was at lssue, 
II 
In neither of the cases on which the respective parties now 
place their primary reliance did the Court predicate its decl .. 
sion on the Voting Rights Act. In both of those cases, the 
question before the Court was whether it was erro:rr for the 
District Court to approve the inclusion of a multimemberr 
district in the reapportionment plan under review. 
In East CJarroll· Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 
636 (per curiam), the plaintiff contended that population dis-
parities among the parish's wards had unconstitutionally 
denied him the right to cast an effective vote for representa-
tives to the school board and the police jury, the governing 
body of the parish. The District eourt found that the 
parish's existing apportionment was unconstitutional. As a 
remedy, the court adopted a reapportionment plan, suggested 
by the police jury, that pFovided for at-large election of the 
members of both the police Jury and the school board. Fol-
lowing the 19'10 census, the District Court directed the police 
jury and school board to submit revised reapportionment 
plans. They resubmitted the plan calling for at-large elec-
tions, and the District Court again approved this plan. After 
a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court's decision/ 7 the court sitting en bane r~versed on th<t 
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ground that the multimember arrangement approved by the 
District Court was unconstitutional.18 
When we reviewed the case, we concluded that it was im-
proper for the Court of Appeals to base its decision on a con-
stitutional ground in view of the fact that the District Court 
had violated the frequently reaffirmed "rule that when United 
States district courts are put to the task of fashioning reap-
. portionment plans to supplant concededly invalid stat.e legis-
lation, single-member districts are to be preferred absent 
unusual circumstances." 424 U. S., at 639. Thus, we held 
in East Carroll that the plan approved by "the District Court 
was a judicial plan for purposes of subst.antive review. 
Although the issue was not raised by ·the parties, we also 
stated in East Carroll that ·the plan was a judicial plan for 
purposes of § 5 preclearance. Neither of the parties had ar-
gued that § 5's preclearance requirement was applicable in 
that case. However, the1Jnitea-states, as amicus curiae, had 
contended that, because the plan had been submitted by the 
legislative bodies of a covered jurisdiction, prec1earance was 
required. We rejected that argument in a footnot-e: 
"fC]ourt-ordered plans resulting from equitable jurisdic-
tion over adversary proceedings are not controlled by 
§ 5. Had the East Carroll police jury reapportioned it-
self on its own authority, clearance under § 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act would clearly have been required. 
Connor v. Waller, 421 U. S. 656 (19'75). Itowever, in 
submitting the plan to the District Court, the jury did 
not purport to reapportion itself in accordance with the 
1968 enabling legislation . . • which permitted police 
18 See Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297 (CA5 1973) (en bane). 
In the Court of Appeals, the appellants had al~o argued that the at-large 
election was not permitted by state law because the Louisiana ~tatute that 
authorized the use of multirnember districts had never become effective· 
since it had not been precleared pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.. 
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JUnes and school boards to adopt at-large elections. 
App. 56. Moreover, since the Louisiana enabling legis-
lation was opposed by the Attorney General of the 
United States under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the 
jury did not have the a.uthority to reapportion itself ...• 
Since the reapportionment scheme was submitted and 
adopted pursuant to court order, the preclearance proce-
dures of § 5 do not apply. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 
690, 691 (1971)." 424 U. S., at 638-639, n. 6. 
Petitioners rely heavily upon this footnote. While their re .. 
Hance is understandable, the footnote is not dispositive in 
this case. The discussion of § 5 in East Carroll was dictum 
unnecessary to the decision in that case. It is, therefore, not 
controlling in this case, in which the impact of § 5 is directly 
placed in issue.10 Moreover, our subsequent decision in Wise 
v. Lipscomb, 437 U. S. 535, indicates that. at least to the ex-
tent tha.t East Carroll addressed the Voting Rights Act, it 
must be narrowly limited to its particular facts. 
In Wise v. Lipscomb, the District Court held that the sys-
tem of at-large election to the Dallas City Council unconsti-
tutionally diluted the voting strength of black citizens. 'l'he 
court thereafter gave the City Council an opportunity to pre-
pare and submit a new apportionment plan. In response, 
the City Council passed a resolution stating the Council's in-
tention to pass an ordinance providing for the election of 
eight council members from single-member districts, and for 
10 THE CHIEF JusTICE, in his concurring opinion in East Carroll, pointed 
out that the Court's discussion of the preclearance i:;sue was dictum: 
"I consider it unnecessary to reach the question discussed, ante, at 638-
639, n. 6. It was, as tbe Court observes in n. 6, 'not raised by the peti-
tioners, nor did respondent file a cross-petition.' The scope of § 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act is an important matter, and I would not undertake to 
express any view on what the Court discusses by way of dicta in n. 6.'' 
424 U. S., at 640. 
To the extent that the dictum in the East Carroll footnote is inconsistent 
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the election of the. three remaining members from the city 
at-large. The District Court conducted a hearing "'to de-
termine the constitutionality of the new proposed plan' " and 
held that it was "a valid legislative Act." See 437 U. S., at 
538-539. The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on East 
Carroll to hold that it was error for the District Court merely 
to evaluate the new plan under constitutional standards with-
out also deciding whether exceptional circumstances justified 
the inclusion of a multimember district in that .iudicially-
imposed reapportionment plan. See 551 F. 2d 1043 (CA5 
1977). 
The question this Court addressed was whether the District 
Court had committed error by failing to apply the usual pre-
. sumption against multimeinber districts in judicial reappor-
tionment plans. In his opinion announcing the judgment of 
· the Court, JuSTICE WHITE, joined by · JusTICE STEWART, 
answered that question by holding that · the presumption did 
not apply because it is "appropriate, whenever practicable, 
to afford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet 
constitutional requirements by adopting a substitute measure 
rather than for the federal court to devise and order into 
effect its own plan." 437 U. S .. at 540. Jus·riCE WHITE 
distinguished East Carroll on· the ground that the legislative 
bodies in that case had not purported to reapportion them-
selves and. indeed, had been without power to reapportion 
themselves under state law because the Louisiana enabling 
statute had been invalidated under the Voting Rights Act.20 
20 Jus1•rcE WHr'rE explained why East Ca1'1'oll did not support the judg-
. ment of the Court of Appeals: 
"[W]e empl1asized tin Ea:;t Ca1·roll] that the bodies which submitted the 
plans did not purport to renpportion thrmselves and, furthermore, could 
not even legally do so under federal law because state legit>lation pro-
viding tl1em with sucl1 powers had been disapproved by the Attorr•ey 
General of the United States uncler § 5 of the Voting Right s Act of 1965. 
424 U. S., at' 638 n. "6, '1)37 n. 2. Under these circumstances, it was con-
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The Dallas City Council, in contrast, had acted within its 
inherent legislative authority in devising and submitting a 
reapportionment plan to replace the plan invalidated by the 
District Court in Wise. See il37 U. S., at 545-546. 
JusTICE PowELL's separate opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment, was joined by the THE CHIEF' 
"JusTICE, JusTICE BLACKMUN, and JusTICE REHNQUIST. Jus~ 
TICE PowELL a.greed with JusTICE WHITE's conclusion that 
' the Dallas reapportionment plan was a 'legislative plan for 
·purposes of the application of the presumption against mul-
·timember districts. However, relying upon Burns v. Richard-
son, 384 U. S. '73, JusTICE PowELL disagreed with JusTICE 
·.WHITE's suggestion that "'East Carroll l1ad held that a pro-
posed reapportionment plan may be considered legislative 
only if the legislative body that suggested the plan had au-
thority to enact it un'der state law. 437 U. S., at 548.n In 
JusTICE PowELL's view, the legislative body's authority under 
state law was irrelevant to the question before ·the Court. 
He explained that the critical difference between a legislative 
plan and a court-impose·d plan for purposes of substantive 
review was that the ·rormer reflected the policy choices of the 
elected representatives of the peoi>1e, whereas the latter rep-
resented the remedht1 'directive of a federal court.22 Defer-
of a legislative Act of re:1pportionment performed in accordance with the 
political processe~ of the community in question." 437 U. S., at 545. 
21 1'he 'Disttict Court in Burns, after striKing down Hawaii's senate 
·apportionment s·cheme, directed tne legi~lature to enact a proposed interim 
1Jlan ··periding 'tbe constitutional amendment required for reapportion-
·ment urider Hawaii'law. See'384 U. S., nt 80-81. The legislature com-
plied with 'fhe court's order, but the court found the proposed interim 
plan unacceptable. On appeal, this Court treated the proposed plan as 
a. legi~lative plan, despite the fact that tl1e Hawaii Legislature was wi'thou't 
power to reapportion itself absent a constitutional amendment. 
22 JUi:mcE PowELL's opinion made it plain that the crucial factor was 
the legislature's exerci~e of its judgment, not its legislative power : 
"The essential point is thut the Dallas City Council exerci~ed a ]egisla~ 
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ence to the judgment of the legislative body was required 
even if that body lacked authority under state law to adopt 
the proposed reapportionment plan.23 
In dissent, JusTICE MARSHALL, joined by JusTICE BRENNAN 
and JusTICE STEVENS, expressed the opinion that Wise was 
indistinguishable from East Carroll and that the Court of 
Appeals therefore had correctly applied the presumption 
against multimember districts. 437 U. S., at 550-554. Jus-
TICE MARSHALL, however, agreed with the majority that it 
would not be proper to reach any question under the Voting 
Rights Act because Texas had not been subject to the Act 
when the case was pending in the District Court.24 
tJf the people, rather than the remedial directive of a feut•ntl 
court. . . . Th[el rule of deference to locallegi~lative judgment~> rcmainl:l 
in force even if, as in Bums, our examination of state law suggests that 
the local body lacks authority to reapportion it~>elf." 487 U. S., at 548. 
23 In reaching this conclusion, JusTICE PowELL read East Carroll "as 
turning on its peculiar facts": 
"Because the brief per curiam in East Carroll did not even cite Burns, 
I would read it as turning on its peculiar facts . In response to the litiga-
tion in East Carroll, the legislnture enacted a ;;tatute enabling police 
juries and school boards to reapportion themselvPS by employing at-large 
elections. That enabling legislation was disapproved by the Attorney 
General of the United States under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 ... because of its impermissible impact on Negro voters. This 
determination meant that the specific plans proposed by the school board 
and police jury in that case would have had unlawful rffects. Because 
their legislative judgment had been found tainted in that respect, it 
followed that the normal presumption of legitimacy afforded the balances 
reflected in legislative plans ... could not be indulged. To the extent 
that East Carroll implies anything further about the prirwiple establiiihed 
in Bums, the latter must be held to control." 437 U. S., at 549. 
24 At the outset of his opinion, Jus•rJCE MARSHALL summarized his 
position: 
"I agree with the majority's decision not to rcacl1 the Voting Rights Act 
question, since it was not presented to either of the courts below. I also 
agree with the analysis of our past decisions fouud in Part II of Mn. 
Jus'J.'ICE WHrrE's opinion. I cannot agree, however, that the action:5 of 
the Dallas City CGtmcil are distinguishable from those of the local govern-
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While it is clear that Wise, like East Carroll, did not re-
quire the Court to decide any statutory issue, the reference~ 
to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act · in JusTICE WHITE's opinion 
annouucing the judgment of the Court are nevertheless · in-
lltructive. After pointing out that "the distinctive impact" 
of § 5 upon the power of the States to reapportion themselve' 
must be observed in th6 normal case, 437 U. S., at 541-542, 
JusTICJ<.J WHITE stated: 
"Plans · imposed by court order are not subject to the 
requirements of § 5, but under that provision, a State 
or political subdivision subject to the Act may not 'enact 
or seek to administer' any 'different' voting qualification 
or procedure with respect to voting without either ob-
tainiug a declaratory judgment from the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia that the pro-
posed change 'does not have the purpose and will not 
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote 
on account of race or color' or submitting the change to 
the Attorney General and affording him an appropriate 
opportunity to object thereto. A new reapportionment 
plan enacted by a State, including one purportedly 
adopted in response to invalidation of the prior plan by 
a federal court, will not be considered 'effective as law,' 
Connor v. Finch, 431 tJ. S., at 412; Connor . v. Waller, 
421 U. S. 656 (1975), until it has been submitted arid 
has received clearance under § 5. Neither, in those eir-
ing body in Ea8t Car1·oll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 
(1976). I therefore conclude thut the plan ordered by the Di~trict Court 
here must be evaluated in accordance with the federal common law 01' 
remedies applicable to judic·ially devi~ed reapportionment plans." 437 
U. S., at 550. 
In his opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, Jus•rrcE WHI'l'E 
pointed out that Texas had not been ~ubject to the Voting Rights Aet 
when the ca~e was pending in the Di~trict Court. Icl ., at 542. JusTICE 
l~oWELL also agreed with the- decl;:;ion not to address the Voting Rights 
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cumstances, until clearance has been obtained, should a 
court address the constitutionality of the new measure. 
Connor v. Finch, supra; Connor v. Waller, supra." 437 
U. S., at 542 (footnote omitted). 
Neither East Carroll nor Wise decided the precise question 
that is now presented. Nonetheless, both JusTICE WHITE's 
opinion and JusTICE PowELL's opinion surely foreshadowed 
the holding we announce today. For both opinions indicate 
that the fact that the reapportionment plan before us was 
devised in response to an order of a federal court does not 
change its character as a legislative plan. In addition, Jus-
TICE PowELL's opinion indicates that the Commissioners 
Court's power under Texas law to adopt this plan should be 
irrelevant to the decision in this case. 
III 
This is not a case in which the language of the controlling 
statute unambiguously answers the question presented. 'The 
Solicitor General, on behalf of the ·united States as amicus 
curiae, contends that a covered jurisdiction "seek[s] to ad-
minister" a new voting practice when it stibmits a redistrict~ 
ing plan to a District Court as a proposea remedy for a con-
stitutional violation. ·This is a J)lausible.but not an obviously 
correct reading of the statutory language. For there is force 
to the contrary argument that Kieberg County had no in-
tention to administer any new plan until after it was given 
legal effect by incorporation in a .Judicial decree. Arguably, 
therefore, the statute has no application before the District 
Court enters its decree, and because the Act does not require 
the District Court to have its decisions precleared, see Con-
nor v. Jofmson, supra, once such a decree is entered it is too 
late for the statute to qualify the county's duty to administer 
the plan as entered by the District Court. We find sufficient 
ambiguity in the statutory lallguage to make it appropriate 
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In 1975, when Congress adopted the amendments that ulti-
mately brought Texas and Kleberg County within the cover-
age of the Act, it directed special attention to § 5 and to the 
redistricting that would be required after the 1980 census.25 
In its report on S. 1279, the bill that extended the life of the 
Voting Rights Act beyond T975, the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary explained "the future need for the Act" by 
pointing out that redrafting of district lines to correct viola-
tions of the one-person/one-vote rule created opportunities 
to disenfranchise minority voters.26 "By providing that Sec-
tion 5 protections not be removed before 1985, S. 1279 would 
guarantee Federal protection of minority voting rights dur-
25 Because the 1975 extension of the Voting Uights Act is tl1e con-
trolling statute in this case, the legislative history of that extension is 
of particular relevance. See Dougherty County Board of Education v. 
'Wh·ite, 439 U. S. 32, 46. 
26 The Senate Report emphasized the importance of the preclearance 
procedure: 
"The provisions of S. 1279 propose to amend the Act so that the special 
remedies, including Section 5 preclearance, will be operative for an addi-
tional ten years. Although the 1965 legislation and the 1970 amendments 
did, in large part, provide for only five year coverage periods at a time, 
the Committee concludes that it is imperative that a ten year extension 
now be adopted in order to insure the applicability of Section 5 protec-
tions during the reapportionment and redi~tricting which will take place 
subsequent to the 1980 Decennial Census. 
"Approximately one-third of the Justice Department's objections l1ave 
been to redi~trictings at thr, state, county and city levels. (S. Hearings 
539- 540, 581-582). This past experience ought not be ignored in terms 
of assessing the future need for the Act. It is ironic that the Supreme 
Court'" 'one .man-one vote' ruling [Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)] 
has created opportunities to di~franchise minority voters. Having to 
redraft district line~ in compliance with that ruling, jurisdictions may not 
always take care to avoid discriminating against minority voters in that 
process. By providing that Section 5 protections not be removed before 
1985, S. 1279 would guarantee Federal protection of minority voting 
rights during the years that the post-census n·districtings will take place.'' 
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mg the years that the post-census redistrictings will take 
place." 27 
The Committee unambiguously stated that the statutory 
protections are to be available even when the redistricting 
is ordered by a federal court to remedy a constitutional vio-
lation that has been established in pending federal litigation. 
The Committee Report is crystal clear on this point: 
"Thus, for example, where a federal district court 
holds unconstitutional an apportionment plan which pre-
dates the effective date of coverage under the Voting 
Rights Act, any subsequent plan ordinarily would be 
subject to Section 5 review. In the typical case. the 
court either will direct the governme11tal body to adopt 
a new plan and present it to the coutt for consideration 
or else itself choose a plan ·from among those presented 
by various parties to the litigation. In either situation, 
the court should defer its consideration of--or selection 
among-any pians presented to it untll such time as 
these plans have been submitted for Section 5 review. 
Only after such review shouid the district court proceed 
to any remaining fourteenth or -fifteenth amendment 
questions that may be raised. 
"The one exception where Section 5 review would not 
ordinarily be available is where the court, because of 
exigent circumstances, act~aiiy fashions the plan itseH 
instead of relying on a pian presented by a litigant. 
This is the iimited meaning of the 'court decree' excep-
tion recognized in Connor v. Johnson. 402 U. S. 690 
(1971). Even in these cases, however, if the governmen-
tal bocly . subsequently adopts a plan patterned aftet 
the court's . plan, Section 5 review would be required, 
Conn?r v. Waller, supra. Furthermore, in fashioning 
the pla~ , the court should follow the appropriate Secti01~ 
5 standards, including the body of administrative and 
I ~,. ~· . I 
fl7 Senate Report, at 18. 
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judieial precedents developed in Section 5 cases." S. 
Rep. No. 94-295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 18-19 (1975).2a 
The view expressed by the Committee is consistent with 
the basic purposes of the statute and with the well-settled 
rule that § 5 is to be given a broad construction. See, e. g., 
Dougherty County Board of Education v. White, 439 U. S. 
32, 38; United States v. Sheffield Board of Commissioners, 
43.5 U. S. 110, 122-123; Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 
387. The preclearance procedure is designed to forestall the 
danger that local decisions to modify voting practices will 
impair minority access to the eiectoral process. 29 The fed-
eral interest in preventing local juri1:dictions from making 
changes that adverselv affect the rights of minority voters is 
the same whether a change is required to remedy a constitu-
tional violation or is mereiv the product of a community's 
perception of the desirabiiity of responding to new social 
patterns.30 I 
28 The Committee went on to state that, in its judgment, ~!) had beell 
prorerl:v applied bv the District Court in Gaillard v. Young, No. 74-1265 
(S. C. 1975). In Gaillard, the District Court invalidated an existing il p-
portionment plan and .direrted tl1at any remedial plan proposed b~ the 
parties be precle!_lred by .the A~!orney General before it would be ern-
bodied in a final decree. SETmte Heport, at 19. In their brief in this ease, 
petitioners conceded t,bat Goillar~ "involved facts identical to those in 
this case." Brief for Petitioners 25. 
29 See, e. g .. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301; Allen v. 
State Board of Fl_lections, s~\3 u, S. 544. 
30 Moreover, even after a federal court has found a distrirting plan 
tmco,stitutional, "redistricting and reapportioning legislative bodh is a 
legislative task which the federal courts should make every effort not to 
pre-empt." Wise v. Lovscomb, sur>!a. 437 U. S., at 539 (oninion of 
WHITE, J.). See also Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S., at 27. Our prior 
decisiof!S in the apportionment armt indicate that, in the normal f'il~e. ~ 
rourt that has invalidated a Statejs exi~tin~ apportionment plan ~hou1d 
enjoin implernentatiop of that plan and ~ive the legislature an onportnnit~· 
to devise an acceptable replarement before its"Jf nndPrt~king the tPsk of 
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It is true, of course, that the federal interest may be pro· 
tected by the Federal District Court presiding over ongoing 
litigation, but sound reasons support the Committee's view 
that the normal § 5 preclearance procedures should neverthe-
less be followed in cases such as this.31 The procedures con-
templated by the statute reflect a congressional choice in 
favor of specialized review-either by the Attorney General 
of the United States or by the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia. Because a large number of 
voting changes must necessarily undergo the preclearance 
process, centralized review enhances the· likelihood that re-
curring problems will be resolved in a consistent and expedi-
Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 377 U. S. 656, 676; Ely v. Klahr, 403 
U. S. 108, 114, and n. 6. Cf: Gaffney v.' Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 749. 
"[J]udicial relief becomes appropriate only ·when a legi:-;lature fail:, to 
reapportion according to federal con·stitutional requisites in a timely 
fashion after having had an ·adequate opportunity to do so." Reynold8, 
supra, 377 U.S., at 586; B·urns v·: Richdrdson, supra, 384 U.S., at 85. 
Thus, in the normal case, the legislature will enact au apportionm<'nt jJlan 
to replace that invalidated by the court; such a plan clParly must be pre-
cleared under§ 5. See Connor v.' Waller,· 421 U.S·. 656 (per curiam) . 
81 Our decision in United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren 
County , 429 U . S. 642 (per curiam), illustrates that a District Court '~ 
conclu~ion that a reapportim>ment plan proposed by a covered juri~diction 
complies with constitutional requirements is not a ·substitute for § 5 reYiew. 
In Warren County, the Attorney Genera1 filed n § 5 action in the District 
Court. The court enjoined the county from implementing an apportion-
ment plan that 1lad not been preclea'rpd under § 5, and directed it to 1mb-
mit a new plan for preclearance·. ·when the ('Ounty was unable to obtain 
th<;> Attorney General's approval for either of two proposed plans , it ~ub­
mitted the plans to the Di~trict Court. · The court adopted one of the plans 
despite the ('Ounty's failme to obtain the Attorney General's approval, 
finding that the plan t1eithrr diluted minority voting strength nor violated 
the one-per~on/one-vote principle. 429 U . S., at 643-644. This Court 
revPrsed , holding that it was error for the District Court to determine 
the constitutional validity of the county's plan and to order that it be 
implemrnted, rather than limiting its inquiry in the § 5 suit to the· 
que~tion whether the county had complied with § 5. 
50-l~OPINION 
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tious way.32 MoreoveF, if covered jurisdictions could avoid 
the normal preclearance procedure by awaiting litigation 
challenging a refusal to redistrict after a census is completed, 
the statute might have the unintended effect of actually en-
couraging delay in making obviously needed changes in dis-
trict boundaries. The federal interest in evenhanded review 
of all changes in covered jurisdictions is furthered by the ap-
plication of the statute in cases such as this. 
The application of the statute is not dependent on a show-
ing that the county's proposed pian is defective in any way. 
Cf. United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 
429 U. S. 642 (per curiam); Morrts v. Gressette, 432 U. S. 
491. The prophylactic purposes of the § 5 remedy are 
achieved by automatically requiting "review of all voting 
changes prior to implementation. by the covered jurisdic-
tions." Senate Report, at 15 (emphasis supplied).33 It is 
therefore not material that the pian submitted by the Com-
missioners Court of Kleberg County in this case was actually 
prepared by an independent e~pert. His expertise may facil-
itate the satisfactory completion of the preclearance process, 
but it does not obviate the preclearance requirement itself. 
For just as the reasons for the county's decision to propose 
a new plan are irrelevant to the statutory preclearance re-
quirement, so also is the particular method that is employed 
in formulating the plan that is submitted to the court on 
behalf of the county irrelevant. 
82 For example, in 1976, covered jurisdictions submitted 7,470 proposed 
changes to the Department of Justice for preclearance under § 5; the 
Department interposed objec:tions to 62 of those submissions. See Hear-
ings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary on the GAO Report on the Voting 
Rights Act, 95th Cong., 2cl Sess., 35-36 (1978) (statement of Drew ~. 
Days III, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Divitlion). 
33 See aiso H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 5, 8-11 
(1975); H. ll. Rep. No, 91-397, 9lst Cong., M Sess., 6-8 (1969). 
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The application of the statute also is not dependent upon 
any showing that the Commissioners Court had authority 
under state law to enact the apportionment plan at issue in 
this case.34 As JusTICE PowELL pointed out in Wise v. Lips-
comb, supra, the essential characteristic of a legislative plan 
is the exercise of legislative judgment. The fact that par-
ticular requirements of state law may not be satisfied before 
a plan is proposed to a federal court does not alter ·this es-
sential characteristic. The applicability of § 5 to specific re-
medial plans is a matter of federal Jaw that federal courts 
should determine pursuant to a uniform federal rule. 
As we construe the congressional mandate, it requires that 
whenever a covered jurisdiction submits a proposal reflecting 
the policy choices of the elected representatives of the peo-
ple-no matter what constraints have limited the choices 
available to them-the preclearance requirement ofthe Vot-
ing Rights Act is applicable.35 It was, therefore, error for 
84 The parties appear to agree that the Commissioners Court had author-
ity under TPxas law to redraw the boundaries of the commis:sioners1 
precincts. Petitioners contend, however, that the CommissionE'rs Court 
was without power to adopt 'the particular apportionment plan at issue· in 
this case because it is permitted to redraw the boundaries of election pre-
cincts only in a · July or August term. The plan in this case was sub-
mittE'd to the District Court in Noveri1ber and was approved by that 
court in January. See Tex. Elec. Code Ann., Art: 2.04 (1) (Vernon Supp. 
1980). ElPction precincts are subunits of commissioners' precincts that 
determine where a voter registers and votes. Because ·the reapportion-
ment plan submitted by the Commissioners Court resulted in the splitting 
of several election precincts between two commissioners' precincts, peti-
tioners contend that tl1e plan altered the boundaries of election precincts 
in violation of state law. Since we conclude that the Commissioners 
' Court's atithority under Texas law to enact this plan is irrelevant for 
purposes of § 5 coverage, we need not resolve this question of state law. 
At any rate, it is clear that the Commissioners Court possesses general 
authority to reapportion itself; petitioners challenge only the timing of the 
submission and adoption of the plan in this case. 
85 Petitioners argue that the interposition of a preclearance requirement 
will encourage dilatory tactics by incumbents who will continue to repre. 
" ! 
' . ' 
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the District Court to act on the county's proposed plan be-
fore it had been submitted to the Attorney General or the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia for• 
preclearance. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
~ent ·malapportioned districts during the review process. The DistriQt 
Courts, however, have ample power to fashion interim remedies to avoiil 
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JUSTICE POWELL, ~£ring.# 
1 ~\ .. ./ 
The decision today is foreshadowed by Wise v. 
Lipscomb,_437 U.S. 535 (1978), and I join the Court's 
5 
opinion. The constitutionality of §5 of the Voting Rights 10 
Act of 1965 has been sustained by prior cases. If the 
question were presented for reconsideration, I would 
adhere to the contrary view as previously expressed. City 
of Rome v. United States, 446 u.s. 156, 193 (1980) 
(Powell, J., dissenting); Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. 15 
White, 439 u.s. 32, 48 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting); 
Georgia v. United States, 411 u.s. 526, 545 (1973) 
(Powell, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Board 
of Commissioners of Sheffield, 435 u.s. 110, 141 (1978) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Allen v. State Board of 20 
......,. ., - - ....._ ~ - - - ""\ t"'\ "" ..... - II"" A A II"" I"\ r - - --='1 -- A I , 1"\ ,- 1\. \ I 'I'T - - , - - ~ 
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~1· 
JUSTICE POWELL, ~urrin~.P 
The decision today is foreshadowed by Wise v. 
Lipscomb,_437 U.S. 535 (1978), and I join the Court's 
5 
opinion. The constitutionality of §5 of the Voting Rights 10 
Act of 1965 has been sustained by prior cases. If the 
question were presented for reconsideration, I would 
adhere to the contrary view as previously expressed. City 
of Rome v. United States, 446 u.s. 156, 193 (1980) 
(Powell, J., dissenting); Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. 15 
White, 439 u.s. 32, 48 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting); 
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 545 (1973) 
(Powell, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Board 
of Commissioners of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 141 (1978) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Allen v. State Board of 20 
Elections, 393 u.s. 544, 586 and n. 4 (1969) (Harlan, J., 
2. 
concurring and dissenting); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
383 u.s. 301, 358 (1966) (Black, J., concurring and 
dissenting).* 
*In his dissent, Mr. Justice Black stated that his 
"objection to §5 is that [it] . conflict[s] with the 
most basic principles of the Constitution." 383 u.s., at 
358.Mr. Justice Black added: 
"Section 5, by providing that some of the States 
cannot pass state laws or adopt state 
constitutional amendments without first being 
compelled to beg federal authorities to approve 
their policies, so distorts our constitutional 
structure of government as to render any 
distinction drawn in the Constitution between 
state and federal power almost meaningless. One 
of the most basic premises upon which our 
structure of government was founded was that the 
Federal Government was to have certain specific 
and limited powers and no others, and all other 
power was to be reserved either 'to the States 
respectively, or to the people.' Certainly if 
all the provisons of our Constitution which 
limit the power of the Federal Government and 
reserve other power to the States are to mean 
anything, they mean at least that the States 
have power to pass laws and amend their 
constitutions without first sending their 
officials hundreds of miles away to beg federal 
authorities to approve them." Id., at 358-359. 
The right freely to vote must be safeguarded vigilantly. 
If a state law denies or impairs this right, in violation 
of the Constitution or of a valid federal law, the courts 
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JusncE PowELL, concurring. 
The decision today is foreshadowed by Wise v. L1:pscomb, 
437 U. S. 535 (1978), and I join the Court's opinion. The 
constitutionality of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has 
been sustained by prior cases. If the question were pre-
sented for reconsideration, I would adhere to the contrary 
view as previously expressed. City of RomeY. United States, 
446 U.S. 156, 193 (1980) (PowELL, J .. dissenting); Dougherty 
County Bd. of Ed. v. White, 439 U.S. 32. 48 (1978) (PowELL, 
J., dis enting); Georgia v. United States, 411 P. ~. 526. 545 
( 1973) (PowELL, J., disseuting). See also United States Y. 
Board of Cmmnissioners of Sheffield, 434 U.S. 110. 141 (1978) 
(STEVENt;, J., dissenting); Allen v. State Board of E'lectious, 
393 U.S. 544, 586. and n. 4 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring ami 
dissenting); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 
358 (1966) (Black, J., concurring and disse11ting).* 
*In his di;;:<rttt, .lu::;tic•p Black ;;tatrd that his "objrctiou to § 5 i::; that 
[it I ... conflict! ~J with thr mo;,;t ba~ie principle~ of the Con~tilution." 
:~83 U. S., at :35R .Ju.sticr Black added: 
"Seetion 5, b~· providillg that ~ome of thr Stat<·,; c·a tuwl pas.,; :::tate Jaws 
or adopt ~tatr c·on8titutioua l amrndmc•nt~; without first briu~ compell ed 
to heg frdcral authoritir~ to approve tlwir poliei<'.,;, ~;o di~tort~ our c·ou-
~titutional ~trueture of govemrrwnt Hi:! to n•nd<'l' 1111~· distinction drawn in 
the Constitution betweru ~>tate and fedrral power almo:<l Htraninglcss. 
Om' of the most ba~ie prrmi;;e8 upon which our ~t rueture of govennnent 
wa~ founded wa.,; lhat the Federal Govemment was to have ecrtaiu ::;pceific 
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and limited powers and no ot hPrs, ami t~II other powrr wa~ to be rcl:irrvrd 
Pitlwr ' to thr States re:;pectively, or to the people.' Certainly if all the 
pr
1
ovi:sion::; of our Con~titution which limit the power of the Federal 
Government and reserve other power to the StateH are to menn anything, 
they mPan 11t least thnt the Stall'~ have power to pal:i~ laws and amend 
their con;;titution::; without fir~t srnding their official;; hundreds of mile;; 
awny to beg federal authoritie,.: to approve them ." !d .. at 358-;{59. 
Tlw right freely to vote rnu~t be ;;afeguarded vigilant!~·. lf a state law 
denie~< ·or impairs this right , in violatjou of the Con~titution .or of a vrtlid 
federal law, the court::; arr the proper and traditional forum for redre:;s 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
The decision today is foreshadowed by Wise v. 
Lipscomb, 437 u.s. 535 (1978), and I join the Court's 
opinion. The constitutionality of §5 of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 has been sustained by prior cases. If the 
question were presented for reconsideration, I would adhere 
to the contrary view as previously expressed. City of Rome 
v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 193 (1980) (Powell, J., , 
dissenting); Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White, 439 u.s. 
32, 48 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting); Georgia v. United 
States, 411 u.s. 526, 545 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
See also United States v. Board of Commissioners of 
Sheffield, 435 u.s. 110, 141 (1978) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 
544, 586 and n. 4 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring and 
2. 
dissenting); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 u.s. 301, 358 
(1966) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).* 
*In h1s d1ssent, Mr. Justice Black stated that his 
"objection to §5 is that [it] .•• conflict[s] with the 
most basic principles of the Constitution." 383 u.s., at 
358. Mr. Justice Black added: 
"Section 5, by providing that some of the 
States cannot pass state laws or adopt state 
constitutional amendments without first being 
compelled to beg federal authorities to 
approve their policies, so distorts our 
constitutional structure of government as to 
render any distinction drawn in the 
Constitution between state and federal power 
almost meaningless. One of the most basic 
premises upon which our structure of 
government was founded was that the Federal 
Government was to have certain specific and 
limited powers and no others, and all other 
power was to be reserved either 'to the 
States respectively, or to the people.' 
Certainly if all the provisons of our 
Constitution which limit the power of the 
Federal Government and reserve other power to 
the States are to mean anything, they mean at 
least that the States have power to pass laws 
and amend their constitutions without first 
sending their officials hundreds of miles 
away to beg federal authorities to approve 
them." Id., at 358-359. 
The right freely to vote must be safeguarded vigilantly. If 
a state law denies or impairs this right, in violation of 
the Constitution or of a valid federal law, the courts are 
the proper and traditional forum for redress. 
. 
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